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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to and the conditions under which re-
source misallocation negatively aﬀects aggregate productivity in a model
of heterogeneous ﬁrms to the highest degree. I analytically derive the
minimum aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) under resource mis-
allocation, when frictions are modeled as the taxes levied on a ﬁrm’s
output, and the range of these taxes is provided. I ﬁnd that the lower
limit of the minimum aggregate TFP is the TFP under perfect substitute
goods and constant returns to scale technology. Further, the minimum
aggregate TFP is achieved when the proportion of ﬁrms in the lowest tax
level is small or when the TFP level of these ﬁrms is low.
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1 Introduction
Cross-country diﬀerences in the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) are
one of the important sources for the income disparity between developed and
underdeveloped countries. A large body of research proposes mechanisms that
explain the diﬀerences in the aggregate TFP. As Restuccia and Rogerson (2007)
point out, many of these mechanisms can be characterized as the theory of
resource misallocation. This theory states that frictions due to various reasons
prevent the eﬃcient use of resources, resulting in a low aggregate TFP.
This paper poses the following questions: To what extent do resource misal-
locations aﬀect the aggregate TFP? What kind of resource misallocation aﬀects
the aggregate TFP the most? This paper analytically addresses both these
questions. There are two reasons for posing these questions. First, it is useful
to know the applicability limit of the theory. Because there are inﬁnite possibil-
ities for resource misallocation between ﬁrms, the maximum eﬀect of resource
misallocation is not apparent. Second, the result provides information about the
kind of resource misallocation mechanism researchers should focus on. While
in the standard Ramsey problem, we analyze the conditions under which the
maximum welfare is achieved, this paper analyzes the conditions under which
the minimum aggregate TFP is achieved. In this sense, this paper inverses the
standard Ramsey problem. Hence, I refer to this paper’s analysis as an inverse
Ramsey problem.
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, I develop a simple model
of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms that draws heavily from
previous works (Melitz, 2003, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2007, Hsieh and Klenow,
2007, and Alfaro, Charlton and Kanczuk, 2007). Following Restuccia and Roger-
son (2007), frictions are described as the taxes levied on a ﬁrm’s output. In this
model, the diﬀerences in the taxes across ﬁrms result in resource misallocation
and the loss of the aggregate TFP.1
1Although this model is static, we observe that the numerical value of the aggregate TFP
is the same as that obtained in the dynamic model of Restuccia and Rogerson (2007).
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Using the model, I address the abovementioned questions. I derive the min-
imum level of this aggregate TFP when the lower and upper bounds of the tax
levels are provided, and obtain the conditions under the minimum aggregate
TFP.2 In the model, the higher the elasticity of substitution of goods and the
ﬁrm’s returns to scale are, the lower is the minimum aggregate TFP. The lower
limit of the minimum aggregate TFP is the TFP under perfect substitute goods
and constant returns to scale technology, where the minimum aggregate TFP
relative to the TFP with no frictions is equal to the ratio of the gross maxi-
mum and minimum tax levels (the gross tax level implies 1¡ ¿ , where ¿ is the
taxes levied on a ﬁrm’s output). The result suggests that researchers should
focus on resource misallocation between ﬁrms or sectors that produce relatively
substitutable goods.
Further, I ﬁnd that the minimum aggregate TFP is achieved if the propor-
tion of ﬁrms in the minimum tax level is small or if the TFP of these ﬁrms is
low. Thus, resource misallocation is not necessarily related to the TFP levels
of ﬁrms.3 The result is consistent with the hypotheses that the aggregate TFP
of underdeveloped countries is low because a small number of ﬁrms, such as
state-owned enterprises, is protected by government policies or because the low
TFP ﬁrms are protected by monopoly rights (Parente and Prescott, 1999) or
by size-dependent policies (Guner, Ventura and Xu, 2008). However, this paper
also reveals that to be consistent with data, the latter hypotheses might need
some modiﬁcations, if goods are highly substitutive and the ﬁrm’s returns to
scale is high. On the other hand, the result suggests that the hypothesis that
attributes the low aggregate TFP to the borrowing constraint of small ﬁrms
might encounter diﬃculties when explaining the low aggregate TFP in under-
developed countries. Moreover, I ﬁnd that we need to maintain caution to apply
2I select the ratio of the (gross) lower and upper tax levels as the basis of plausibility. Since
the diﬀerences in the (gross) taxes imply the diﬀerences in the factor input returns, a large
diﬀerence in the lower and upper tax levels is implausible from the viewpoint of arbitrage.
Under the criterion, we need to explain the diﬀerences in the aggregate TFP with a reasonable
ratio of these taxes. Parente and Prescott (2005) developed a similar argument.
3Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) have also noted this point. I clarify that both the propor-
tion and TFP of taxed ﬁrms quantitatively have the same eﬀect on the aggregate TFP.
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the lognormal approximation, which is widely used in the research.
There is a growing body of literature that analyzes the eﬀect of resource
misallocation on the aggregate TFP using the general equilibrium model of
heterogeneous ﬁrms. Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), and
Jones (2008) theoretically analyze the eﬀect of resource misallocation under
several scenarios. While their papers ﬁrst consider the scenarios of resource
misallocation and then analyze their eﬀects on the aggregate TFP, this paper
ﬁrst determines the lowest level of the aggregate TFP resulting from resource
misallocation and then analyzes the scenario that achieves the lowest aggregate
TFP. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2007), among others, measure
frictions on resource misallocation and calculate the eﬀect of these frictions on
the aggregate TFP. This paper’s analysis will help analyze what kind of resource
misallocation is important to their results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model, and Section 3 deﬁnes the aggregate TFP. Given these settings, Section 4
solves the inverse Ramsey problem and analyzes the implication of the results.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Model
I consider an economy where the ﬁnal goods are produced from the intermediate
goods by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, the intermediate
goods are produced by a constant proportion of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms using capital and labor, and the aggregate capital and labor supply is
exogenously provided. In this model, frictions are modeled as taxes levied on
the intermediate ﬁrm’s output.
2.1 Final goods sector
Firms in the ﬁnal goods sector produce ﬁnal goods Y from intermediate goods
fyig. Further, ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods sector are competitive and maximize the
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following problem:
max
fyig
Y (fyig)¡
Z
piyidi;
where
Y (fyig) =
µZ
y½i di
¶ 1
½
;
and pi is an intermediate good price. I assume that 0 < ½ · 1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
pi = y
½¡1
i Y
1¡½; (1)
Y =
Z
piyidi: (2)
2.2 Intermediate goods sector
Firms in the intermediate goods sector produce intermediate goods yi from
capital ki and labor li. The proﬁt maximization problem of a monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods ﬁrm is as follows:
max
ki;li
(1¡ ¿i)piyi ¡ rki ¡ wli; (3)
s.t. yi = aik®i l
°
i ;
where pi is given by (1), ai is the ﬁrm’s TFP, r and w are the factor costs
of capital and labor, respectively. I assume that 0 < ® + ° · 1, and that
½(® + °) < 1. While, here, i corresponds to a ﬁrm that is the price setter for
its output, we can instead consider a model in which i corresponds to a sector,
and the ﬁrms in each sector are price takers. The ﬁnal results do not change
even if we adopt the latter setting.
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From the FOCs, we obtain the following relation:
ki =
(1¡ ¿i)
r
®½piyi; (4)
li =
1
(1 + ¿li)w
°½piyi:
2.3 Resource constraints
The following resource constraints are satisﬁed:
Z
kidi = K;
Z
lidi = L;
whereK and L are the aggregate supply of capital and labor, respectively, which
are exogenously provided.
2.4 Equilibrium allocation
Here, I derive the equilibrium allocation of Y . Substituting (4) into the resource
constraint of capital, we obtain
1
r
=
KR
®½piyi¸idi
where ¸i ´ (1 ¡ ¿i). Substituting this equation into (4) and rearranging, we
obtain
ki = ¾ˆi ˆ¸iK; (5)
where ¾ˆi ´ piyi=(
R
piyidi) and ˆ¸i ´ ¸i=(
R
¾ˆi¸idi). In the same way, we can
obtain
li = ¾ˆi ˆ¸iL: (6)
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By substituting the results arrived at, Y can be rewritten as follows:
Y =
·Z
a½i ¾ˆ
½µ
i
ˆ¸½µ
i di
¸ 1
½
K®L° ;
where µ ´ ®+ °.
In order to obtain the equilibrium allocation of Y , I derive the equilibrium
allocations of ¾ˆi and ˆ¸i. Appendix A shows:
¾ˆi =
a·½i ¸
·½µ
i
W
; (7)
where · ´ 1=(1¡ ½µ) and
W =
Z
a·½i ¸
·½µ
i di:
Using (7), the denominator of ˆ¸i is written as follows:
Z
¾ˆi¸idi =
Z
W
;
where
Z =
Z
a·½i ¸
·
i di:
By using the derived ¾ˆi and ˆ¸i, we ﬁnally obtain the equilibrium allocation of
Y as follows:4
Y =
W
1
½
Zµ
K®L° : (8)
4This is a slightly extended version of the one obtained in Alfaro et al. (2007).
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3 Aggregate TFP
I deﬁne the aggregate TFP A as follows:
A ´ Y
K®L°
:
Subsequently, the aggregate TFP in equilibrium is given by:
A =
W
1
½
Zµ
: (9)
This equation can be rewritten as follows:
A = A¤N;
where
A¤ ´
µZ
a·½di
¶ 1
½¡µ
;
N ´
µZ
a·½iR
a·½i di
º½i di
¶ 1
½
,µZ
a·½iR
a·½i di
º
1
µ
i di
¶µ
;
and ºi ´ ¸·µi . A¤ is the aggregate TFP level when there is no friction. I refer
to N as the relative TFP because it corresponds to the aggregate TFP relative
to the TFP with no frictions. Since
dHi ´ a
·½
iR
a·½i di
di
can be considered as a distribution, N can be further revised as follows:
N =
µZ
º½i dHi
¶ 1
½
,µZ
º
1
µ
i dHi
¶µ
:
We can conﬁrm N · 1 from the property of power means, because 1=½ > µ.
In the following sections, I analyze how N can be lowered by resource mis-
allocation. Moreover, I only consider the case wherein the number of tax levels
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is ﬁnite. Subsequently, N can be rewritten as follows (here, I slightly modify
the notations):
N =
ÃX
i
hiº
½
i
! 1
½
,ÃX
i
hiº
1
µ
i
!µ
; (10)
where hi is the proportion of ﬁrms in the same tax level, adjusted by the ﬁrm’s
TFP
hi ´
Z
j:fºj=ºig
a·½jR
a·½j dj
dj: (11)
Obviously,
P
i hi = 1.
4 Inverse Ramsey Problem
4.1 Derivation of the minimum relative TFP
This section derives the minimum relative TFP, Nmin, when the gross minimum
tax level ¸s ´ (1 ¡ ¿s) and the gross maximum tax level ¸t ´ (1 ¡ ¿t) are
exogenously provided.5 Here, I use the subscript s for the variables with the
minimum tax level, and subscript t for those with the maximum tax level.
Owing to the following proposition, we only need to consider the distribution
of ¸s and ¸t (the proof is presented in Appendix B).
Proposition 1. Nmin is achieved under the following condition: hs + ht = 1.
Then, the inverse Ramsey problem is as follows:
Nmin = min
hs
N
s.t. N = (hsº½s + htº
½
t )
1
½
.³
hsº
1
µ
s + htº
1
µ
t
´µ
; (12)
hs + ht = 1:
5As will be revealed later, we only need to determine the ratio of ¸s and ¸t in order to
derive Nmin.
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From the FOC, we obtain hs, which achieves Nmin, hs;min as follows:6
hs;min =
1
1¡ ½µ
µ
½µ
º½ ¡ 1 ¡
1
º
1
µ ¡ 1
¶
;
where º ´ ºs=ºt. By substituting this equation into (12), we obtain Nmin as
follows:
Nmin =
"µ
1¡ ¹
1¡ ½µ
¶1¡½µ µ
¹
½µ
¶½µ# 1½
(13)
where
¹ ´ º
½ ¡ 1
º
1
µ ¡ 1 =
¸
½µ
1¡½µ ¡ 1
¸
1
1¡½µ ¡ 1
; ¸ ´ ¸s=¸t:
Nmin has the following limit values:
Nmin ¡¡¡!
½!0
eµ¸¡
µ
¸¡1
µ
ln¸
¸¡ 1
¶µ
; (14)
¡¡¡!
½µ!1
1
¸
: (15)
4.2 Analysis of the result
This section analyzes the results obtained in the previous section, when ¸ ´
(1¡ ¿s)=(1¡ ¿t) is between one and ten.7
Figure 1 plots the minimum relative TFP Nmin for the following three cases
using (10), (14), and (15): (i) ½! 0 and µ = 1, (ii) ½ = 1 and µ = 0:9, and (iii)
½µ ! 1. The parameter values of the ﬁrst case are similar to those in Restuccia,
6Appendix C proves that the second-order condition is positive (i.e., N obtained is the
local minimum). Since N under the implicit corner solutions (hs = 0 and hs = 1) is equal
to unity and coincides with the no fraction level, the N that satisﬁes the FOC is the global
minimum.
7The upper bound of ten is not unusual due to the following reason. The ﬁrm’s maximiza-
tion problem in (3) can be rewritten as
max
ki;li
piyi ¡ r
1¡ ¿i
ki ¡ w
1¡ ¿i
li:
Thus, the tax on output can be interpreted as frictions on factor prices. The value of ten for
¸ corresponds to, for example, the rental rate variation between 3% to 30%, which I think is
reasonable as the upper bound.
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Yang and Zhu (2008) and Hayashi and Prescott (2006).8 The parameter values
of the second case are the same as those in Restuccia and Rogerson (2007).
The third case corresponds to Parente and Prescott (1999). The second and
third cases can generate a large loss of the aggregate TFP caused by resource
misallocation, while the ﬁrst case has relatively a low ability. One might infer
from Figure 1 that Nmin lowers as ½µ increases. This inference is correct (for
an explanation, see Appendix D). The result is analogous to the implication of
the standard Ramsey problem that tax on goods with elastic demand highly
distorts welfare.
An interesting point is that the correlation of the ﬁrm’s TFP and tax level
is not required to generate the above results. Although the ﬁrm’s TFP enters
into hs, hs can be changed arbitrarily by changing the proportion of ﬁrms.
This result is particularly interesting when Nmin converges to the Parente and
Prescott (1999) case, because only at the limit, the proportion of ﬁrms does not
aﬀect the aggregate TFP.
Another interesting point is the discrepancy between the analysis in this
paper and the lognormal approximation used in the literature.9 If we assume
that the distribution of the ﬁrm’s TFP and tax is approximated by a joint
lognormal distribution, from (9), the aggregate TFP can be approximated as
follows:
A ' exp
½
¹ln a +
1
1¡ ½µ
¡
½¾2ln a ¡ µ¾2ln¸
¢¾
;
where ¹ln a is the mean of ln ai, and ¾2ln a and ¾
2
ln¸ are the variances of ln ai and
ln¸i. Suppose that ¾2ln a = 0 and ¾
2
ln¸ > 0. Then, as ½µ converges to unity, the
aggregate TFP converges to zero, even if the variance of taxes is considerably
small. The result stems from a characteristic of the lognormal distribution that
its domain is unbounded. Our result suggests that caution is required when the
lognormal approximation is applied.
8All of the papers cited here pertain to the theory of resource misallocation.
9See, for example, Manuelli (2003), Hsieh and Klenow (2007), and Jones (2008).
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Next, I examine the composition of ﬁrms under the minimum relative TFP.
I plot the hs under the minimum relative TFP, hs;min, in Figure 2. We ﬁnd that
hs;min is small. This is because the maximum eﬀect of frictions on the relative
TFP increases as hs decreases, in the following manner:10
lim
¸!1
N = h
1
½¡µ
s : (16)
(On the other hand, hs;min does not become zero, because the eﬀect of frictions
when ¸ is small decreases as hs decreases. Figure 3 illustrates the trade-oﬀ
between these two eﬀects.) Moreover, hs;min decreases as ½µ increases. This
is because, as (16) suggests, the maximum eﬀect of the frictions lowers as ½µ
increases. In order to compensate for it, hs should be lower.
4.3 What kind of resource misallocation should be focused
on?
The results in the previous section suggest that in order to understand the
diﬀerences in aggregate TFP between developed and underdeveloped countries,
it is important to focus on resource misallocation between ﬁrms or sectors that
produce relatively substitutable goods.
It is also important to explore the resource misallocations that are consistent
with small hs. The hypothesis that a small proportion of ﬁrms, for example,
state-owned enterprises, is selectively protected by the government policies is
consistent with small hs. The hypothesis that low TFP ﬁrms are protected
is also consistent with small hs. Table 1 reports the hi of ﬁrms (referred to
as plants in their paper) classiﬁed by the TFP levels (instead of the same tax
level) in the U.S., which is calculated from Table 2 in Restuccia and Rogerson
10(16) also achieves the lower bound of Restuccia and Rogerson’s (2007) numerical exper-
iment. For example, in their uncorrelated case, wherein the frictions were uncorrelated with
the ﬁrm’s TFPs, hs corresponds to 0.5. Then, the lower bound of the relative TFP given by
(16) is (1=2)0:1 ¼ 0:93, which is close to their lowest value.
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(2007).11 The hi of ﬁrms with the lowest TFP is 0.04, although such ﬁrms
constitute more than half of all ﬁrms. Hence, if ﬁrms with the lowest TFP is
protected, it would considerably lower the aggregate TFP. However, it should
also be noted that hs;min with high ½µ and relatively high ¸ is smaller than 0.04,
for example, hs;min at ½µ = 0:9 and ¸ = 2 is less than 0.01 (see Figure 4, which
plots the limits of ½µ above which hs;min falls below 0.04). Thus, even if we focus
on resource misallocation with respect to the low TFP ﬁrms, it is important to
explore the possibility that some of the low TFP ﬁrms are selectively protected.
On the other hand, it might be diﬃcult to explain the large diﬀerences in
the aggregate TFP by means of the borrowing constraint of small ﬁrms. This
is because these small ﬁrms belong to (1¡hs;min) of ﬁrms, while as observed in
Table 1, the hi of small ﬁrms is marginal.
5 Conclusion
This paper analytically examines the extent to and the conditions under which
resource misallocation negatively aﬀects the aggregate TFP to the highest de-
gree, when frictions are modeled as the taxes levied on a ﬁrm’s output. The
implications derived from the analysis would be eﬀective in researching the
mechanisms of resource misallocation that explain the diﬀerences in the aggre-
gate TFP of developed and underdeveloped countries.
There are several important issues that still need to be addressed in future
research. First, while I derive the minimum aggregate TFP when the lower and
upper tax levels are provided, other speciﬁcations on the constraint of frictions
might be possible. Second, I abstract from ﬁxed costs. Qualitatively, under
the ﬁxed costs, higher frictions on the lower TFP ﬁrms (higher frictions implies
11 Using (6), the hi is measured as
hi =
gia
·½
iP
i gia
·½
i
=
giliP
i gili
;
where gi is the fraction of i ﬁrms, and li is ﬁrm i’s labor input under the assumption that the
U.S. is an economy with no frictions. Note that the measured hi does not depend on ½ and µ.
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higher taxes in this paper’s model) can discourage these ﬁrms from operation
and entry, which results in lowering the aggregate TFP. Thus, lower frictions on
a small proportion of relatively high TFP ﬁrms negatively aﬀect the aggregate
TFP the most. In order to quantitatively analyze this eﬀect, assumptions on
the ﬁxed costs and the distribution of ﬁrms that are not arbitrary are required.
Finally, as emphasized in Jones (2008), complementarity among material inputs
could magnify the resource misallocation eﬀect.
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Appendix
A Derivation of ¾ˆi
By using (1) and (2), ¾ˆi can be written as follows:
¾ˆi =
y½i
Y ½
=
a½i ¾ˆ
½µ
i ¸
½µ
iR
a½i ¾ˆ
½µ
i ¸
½µ
i di
;
where µ ´ ®+ °. By rewriting this equation, we obtain
¾ˆi =
a·½i ¸
·½µ
i
W
;
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where · ´ 1=(1¡ ½µ) and W is deﬁned as
W ´
µZ
a½i ¾ˆ
½µ
i ¸
½µ
i di
¶·
:
W can be further extended as follows:
W =
0@Z a½i ¸½µi
Ã
a·½i ¸
·½µ
ii
W
!½µ
di
1A· :
By rearranging W , we thus obtain
W =
Z
a·½i ¸
·½µ
i di:
Using this result, ¾ˆi can be expressed by exogenous variables.
B Proof of Proposition 1
I prove Proposition 1 by contradiction.
Suppose that there are n tax levels between ¸s and ¸t with positive hi. Sub-
sequently, ºs > º1; : : : ; ºi; : : : ºn > ºt, where ºi ´ ¸·µi . The following conditions
should be satisﬁed:
@ lnN
@ºi
= 0; for all ºi between ºs and ºt.
If these conditions are not satisﬁed, N can be lowered by changing ¸i between
¸s and ¸t. @ lnN=@ºi is given by
@ lnN
@ºi
=
hi
ºi
0B@ 1
hi +
P
m6=i hm
³
ºm
ºi
´½ ¡ 1
hi +
P
m6=i hm
³
ºm
ºi
´ 1
µ
1CA = 0: (17)
16
From this condition, we obtain
º
½¡ 1µ
i =
P
m hmº
½
mP
m hmº
1
µ
m
:
Since this condition holds for any ºj between ºs and ºt, ºi = ºj . Thus, we only
need to consider the case wherein there is one ºi between ºs and ºt.
Next, I examine the second-order condition (SOC) of lnN when (17) is
satisﬁed. I refer to the denominator of the ﬁrst term in the parenthesis in (17)
as R, and the second term as T . Then,
@2 lnN
@º2i
= ¡hi
º2i
µ
1
R
¡ 1
T
¶
+
hi
ºi
µ
½
ºi
R¡ hi
R2
¡ 1
µºi
T ¡ hi
T 2
¶
=
µhi
º2i
hs
³
ºs
ºi
´½
+ ht
³
ºt
ºi
´½
R2
(½µ ¡ 1) · 0:
Equality holds only if hs = ht = 0. Then, the maximum of N is achieved. Oth-
erwise, N becomes the local maximum. Both cases contradict the assumption
that N is the minimum.
C Second-order condition of N
I demonstrate that the SOC of the problem provided in (12) is positive for
¸ > 1. Note that, here, I use lnN instead of N .
The FOC is given by
@ lnN
@hs
=
1
½
r
R
¡ µ t
T
= 0;
where r ´ º½s ¡ º½t , R ´ hsº½s + htº½t , t ´ º1=µs ¡ º1=µt , and T ´ hsº1=µs + htº1=µt .
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The SOC when the FOC is satisﬁed is
@2 lnN
@h2s
= ¡1
½
³ r
R
´2
+ µ
µ
t
T
¶2
= µ
µ
t
T
¶2
(1¡ ½µ) > 0:
D Nmin lowers as ½µ ! 1
Figure 5 displays Nmin powered by 1=µ, over the ranges of ½µ and ¸. In this
ﬁgure, for any ¸, N1=µmin lowers as ½µ increases. The shape of the ﬁgure is pre-
served for Nmin. Thus, for any given µ, Nmin also lowers as ½µ increases (i.e., ½
increases). In addition, for any given ½µ, Nmin lowers as µ increases. Therefore,
Nmin lowers as ½ and µ increase.
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Firm size Small Medium Large
Share of ﬁrms 0.51 0.47 0.02
Average employment 4.2 64.8 1042.0
hi 0.04 0.57 0.39
Table 1: Distribution of ﬁrms. Notes: These numbers are obtained and calcu-
lated from Table 2 of Restuccia and Rogerson (2007). hi is the proportion of
ﬁrms with the same TFP level, adjusted by their TFP, and is calculated in a
manner similar to (11) (here, hi is for ﬁrms with the same TFP level instead of
the same tax level). For the calculation of hi, see footnote 11.
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Figure 1: The minimum relative TFP, Nmin, under diﬀerent parameter values.
Notes: ½ is the parameter on the substitutability of goods. µ is the ﬁrm’s returns
to scale. ¸ is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax levels, (1¡¿s)=(1¡¿t).
20
2
4
6
8
10
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
λ
ρθ
hs, min
Figure 2: Proportion of ﬁrms with the lowest tax level, adjusted by the ﬁrm’s
TFP, hs;min that generates the minimum relative TFP, Nmin, under a range of
parameter values. Notes: ½ is the parameter on the substitutability of goods. µ
is the ﬁrm’s returns to scale. ¸ is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax
levels, (1¡ ¿s)=(1¡ ¿t).
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Figure 3: The relative TFP, N , under two diﬀerent hs. Notes: hs is the pro-
portion of ﬁrms with the lowest tax level, adjusted by the ﬁrm’s TFP. ¸ is the
ratio of the gross lowest and highest taxes, (1¡ ¿s)=(1¡ ¿t).
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Figure 4: The limit of ½µ above which hs;min that generates Nmin falls below
0.04, for each ¸. Notes: ½ is the parameter on the substitutability of goods. µ
is the ﬁrm’s returns to scale. ¸ is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax
levels, (1¡ ¿s)=(1¡ ¿t). For example, for ¸ = 2, ½µ = 0:86, which implies that
with this ¸ and ½µ > 0:86, hs;min becomes less than 0.04.
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Figure 5: The minimum relative TFP powered by 1=µ, N1=µmin under a range of
parameter values. Notes: ½ is the parameter on the substitutability of goods.
µ is the ﬁrm’s returns to scale. ¸ is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest
taxes, (1¡ ¿s)=(1¡ ¿t).
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